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WELCOME TO NEW COLUMBIA: THE FISCAL,ECONOMIC
AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF STATEHOOD FOR D.C.
DavidSchleicher*
Returning from workon astormydayafew monthsago, I wassomewhat
surprisedtofindthelamppostsonthestreetcoveredinD.C. Statehoodsigns. While
suchcampaignsebbandflow, thisleveloffull-streetcoveragewas, tosaytheleast,
impressive. Atthatmoment, withawhooshofwind, thebannersfelloffoneofthe
lamppostsandflew downConnecticutAvenue. Independence, youmightsay, was
intheair.
Andwithgoodreason, too: theDistrictisbooming. Overthepastfiveyears, the
economicgrowthofmetroD.C. hasdramaticallyoutstrippedthenationasawhole.1
In 2013, D.C.s population rose at a faster rate than every state but North Dakota,2
growth that is particularly startling given D.C.s high housing prices.3 Indeed, at
646,449, itspopulationhascometoexceedthatofWyomingandVermont.4 Giventhis
growth, itisnotsurprisingthatthereareincreasedcallsforanew politicalstatus.
Fortoolong, however, thestatehooddebatehasoverwhelminglyfocusedonthe
same set of issues: the impact of statehood on the federal governments structure.
* AssociateProfessor, GeorgeMasonUniversitySchoolofLaw;IrvingS. Ribicoff
VisitingAssociateProfessor, YaleLawSchool. I wouldliketothankJeremyGreenbergand
DanielRauchfortheirexcellentresearchassistance.
1 See CarolMorello& DanKeating, D.C. Region is Nations Richest, Most Educated
Region in the Nation, Census Data Show, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 2010, atA1.
2 See MichaelA. Memoli, California Back on Growth Path, but North Dakota Sets the
Pace, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/30/nation/la-na-nn
-north-dakota-fastest-population-growth-20131230. Reportingonpopulationflowsfrequently
failstoacknowledgetheroleplayedbyhousingprices. Butthecostofhousingissimplythe
priceofadmissionintoacity. Regionsandcitieswithlow housingcosts(becausetheydo
notrestricthousingsupplywithstrictzoningrestrictions), likeHoustonandAtlanta, have
seenhugepopulationinflowsdespitehavinglowerwagesthancitieslikeSanFrancisco, New
York, orWashington, wheredemandforhousinghasexpresseditselfinhighpricesbecause
ofstrictlimitsonhousingsupply. See DavidSchleicher, City Unplanning, 122 YALE L.J.
1670, 167475 (2013) [hereinafter Schleicher 2013].
3 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE RESIDENT POPULATION FOR THE
UNITED STATES, REGIONS, STATES, AND PUERTO RICO: APRIL 1, 2010 TO JULY 1, 2013
(2013), available at http://www.census.gov/popest/data/state/totals/2013.
4 District of Columbia, UNITEDSTATESCENSUSBUREAU (Mar. 27, 2014, 9:54 AM), http:/
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/11000.html;DavidShuster, Racism on Display:Washington,
D.C.s Status in Congress, HUFFINGTONPOST(Jan. 17, 2013, 10:36 AM), htp:/www.huffington
post.com/david-shuster/racist-to-the-core-the-co_b_2492360.html.
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These issues take a variety of formsfrom high-theoretic discussions on the nature
ofrepresentationtogrittyquestionsofCongressionalpartypower.5 YetifD.C. did
become a state, the most impactful change in its citizens lives would not betheir
new abilitytoelectmembersofCongress;itwouldbethedramaticshiftineconomics
andpoliticsthatwouldcomewiththecreationofanew, single-citystategovernment.
IfwewanttoknowwhatlifewilbelikeintheproposedNewColumbia, thesechanges
mustbeourstartingpoint.6
ThisEssaysketchessomeofthelong-term economicandpoliticalconsequences
ofD.C. statehood. Mygoalisnottoaddtothechorusofsupportersoropponentsof
statehood;instead, I aim tofleshoutsomeoftheunseenpromiseandperilthatD.C.
statehoodwouldbring. OnthedayNew ColumbiaenterstheUnion, itwouldbear
aconstellationoffeaturesunprecedentedinthenation: theonlystatewhollypartof
onemetropolitanregion,7 theonlystatewithoutlocalgovernments, andtheonly
whollyurbanstate. Thesefeatures, whichtodatehaveseldom beenconsidered, have
deepimplicationsfortheadvisabilityofstatehoodwhencomparedtothealterna-
tivesofretrocession(becomingpartofMaryland)8 orthestatelessstatusquo. Atthe
sametime, thesefeaturesalsofurnishablueprintforstepstomitigatetherisksand
exploitthebenefitsthatstatehood, ifpursued, wouldoffer.
A quickoverview: PartI ofthisEssaywilldiscussthespecialfiscalandeconomic
conditionsthatNewColumbiawouldface. Ononehand, statehoodwouldbeteralow
D.C. totakeadvantageofperiodsofeconomicsuccess. Inparticular, astateofNew
ColumbiawouldlikelybefreeoftherestrictiveconfinesoftheHeightofBuildings
Act, allowingforgreatergrowthwhendemandforlivinginD.C. ishigh.9 Moreover,
ashasbeennotedelsewhere, theDistrictwouldlikelyalsogaingreatertaxingpower
5 See, e.g., ShaniO. Hilton, Surprise:D.C. Statehood Not a GOP Priority, NBC WASH.
(Aug. 22, 2012, 1:23 PM), http://www.nbcwashington.com/blogs/first-read-dmv/SurpriseDC
-Statehood-Not-a-GOP-Priority-167051805.html;Shuster, supra note4.
6 The name New Columbia has been proposed by statehood advocates as a possible name
forthestateofD.C., andsohasbeenadoptedforthisEssay. See New ColumbiaAdmission
Act, H.R. 292, 113thCong. (2013).
7 RhodeIslandcomesclose, withthirty-eightofthirty-ninemunicipalitiesintheProvidence-
FalRiver-Warwick, RI-MA MetropolitanStatisticalArea. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
MAY 2013 METROPOLITAN AND NONMETROPOLITAN AREA DEFINITIONS (2013), available at
htp://stats.bls.gov/oes/current/msa_def.htm#77200 [hereinafterMAY2013METROPOLITAN].
8 ThepresentterritoryoftheDistrictwasdelimitedby1801 throughtheDistrictof
ColumbiaOrganicAct. See MICHAELK. FAUNTROY, HOME RULE OR HOUSE RULE?CONGRESS
AND THE EROSION OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 29 (2003). Under
theAct, bothVirginiaandMarylandcededpartsoftheirterritorytoform thenew district.
Id. In1846, however, thoseportionsoftheDistrictthatVirginiacededwerereturnedtotheir
originalstate. Id. Asaresult, alllandinthecurrentDistricthasitsterritorialoriginsinMaryland.
Thus, in theory, the Districts land and people could legally be combined with Maryland through
appropriatelegislation.
9 See infra notes 3643 and accompanying text.
2014] WELCOME TO NEW COLUMBIA 91
(althoughitwouldlosesomeformsofgenerousfederalfunding, particularlyinits
Medicaidprogram).10 Yetsuchbenefitscomeataprice: asasingle-citystate, New
Columbiawouldfacedrasticrisksintimesofdownturn. ThefactthatNew Columbia
wouldbeentirelyinoneeconomicregion, andthefactthatitwouldexclusivelybe
thecentercityofthatregion, wouldmeanalmostnecessarilythatthestatewould
face substantialfinancialrisksin the case ofregionaland urban-form related
shocks.11 Moreover, statesfrequentlyredistributemoneyfrom successfulpartsofthe
statetotheunsuccessfultomitigateregionaldownturns: New Columbiawouldnot
have this ability. Whats more, in the event of financial catastrophe, New Columbia
wouldalsobeineligibleforChapter9 bankruptcy, insofarasitwouldbeastateand
notamunicipality.
Such a dynamic understanding of New Columbias fiscal and economic condi-
tionsmakesthecaseforstatehoodweakerandthecaseinfavorofretrocessiontoan
adjoiningstate, astatuswhichwouldallow forthepotentialforgrowthwhileen-
suringafiscalsafetynet, muchstronger. Alternatively, ifstatehoodweretoproceed,
I arguetheNewColumbiansshouldadoptseveralstructuralprotectionsagainsteco-
nomicvolatility. Inparticular, I argueinfavorofabudgetrulethatresultsintheauto-
matic development of a rainy day fund in prosperous times, and a state constitution
thateschewsabalancedbudgetrule.
Part II discusses the implications of New Columbias unique internal politics. As
noted, New Columbiawould betheonlystatewithoutlocalgovernments. The
absenceofseparatespheresforlocalandstateelectionswouldhaveatleasttwo
major implications for New Columbias politics and policy. First, as a state composed
of an overwhelmingly single-party city, New Columbias elections would likely be
decidedlyuncompetitive. Eveninthestatusquo, thisabsenceofparty-levelelectoral
competitionisalikelycauseofmanypathologiesinD.C. politics, from excessive
restrictionsongrowthtoitspersistentproblemswithcorruption. Toensurethestate
ofNew Columbiadoesnotsharethesedefects, anymovetowardsstatehoodwilneed
toincludereformsaimedatintroducingmorepoliticalcompetition. Second, andmore
optimistically, theunprecedentedmarriageofacityandastategovernmentoffersa
powerfulchangeforinnovation. Historically, therelativelycircumscribedlegalpower
ofcitieshaspreventedthem from pursuinganumberofeffectivepoliciesbecause
suchpowersaretheexclusiveprovinceofstates. Further, bigcitiesareoftenlosers
instatepoliticalfights.12 In this context, New Columbias fusion of city and state
providesmanyopportunitiesforpolicyflexibilityanddiscoveryunavailabletomost
bigcities.
10 See infra notes 2135 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 4456 and accompanying text.
12 George Washington Plunkitt famously described New York City as pie for the hayseeds
inthestategovernmentinAlbany. WILLIAM L. RIORDAN, PLUNKITT OF TAMMANY HALL: A
SERIES OF VERY PLAIN TALKS ON VERY PRACTICAL POLITICS 21 (1963).
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I. NEW COLUMBIAN ECONOMICS
Sofar, mostliteratureontheeconomicsofD.C. statehoodfocusesonthestatic,
short-term consequences on the citys budget.13 Suchworkisimportantbutignores
a crucial reality; over the long run, a states fiscal health depends substantially on the
dynamicquestionofhow resilientlyitrespondstoeconomicchange. Thissection
arguesthatthewayNew Columbiarespondstolong-term economicchangeiscrucial
toassessingwhetherstatehoodwouldactualyhelpD.C. residentsand, ifstatehoodis
pursued, whatlegislativeandconstitutionalstructuresmightbestensureprosperity.
Beforeproceeding, though, itisimportanttosummarizethetraditionalarguments
forandagainsttheeconomicsofD.C. statehood. Inthestatusquo, theDistrictiscaught
inabind: itisobligatedtopayforservicesandprogramscommonlyprovidedbystates,
butnotprovidedwiththetaxpowersstatesgenerallypossess.
First, expenditures: theDistricthasalsortsofresponsibilitiesthataccruetostates,
andnotcities, likeMedicaid, childandfamilyservices, andhighereducation. A
2005 studybytheFiscalPolicyInstituteandtheBrookingsInstitutionfoundthatthese
state-likeservicescostthecity$1.1 billionannually.14 Someofthiswastraditionally
offsetbyanannualpaymentbythefederalgovernment.15
Tosomeextent, theseadditionalexpensesweremitigatedin1997. Thatyear, the
FederalGovernmentpassedtheRevitalizationAct, whichremovedsomeofthestate-
likeresponsibilitiesofD.C. inreturnforendingtheannualfederalpaymenttothe
District.16 ThefederalgovernmentbeganpayingfortheD.C. judicialandincarceration
systems, increasedthematchingrateforitsMedicaidfundingtooffsetwhatthecity
wouldordinarilyreceivefrom astategovernment, andassumedresponsibilityfor
theunfundedpensionliabilitiesrackedupbeforetheHomeRuleAct.17 Morerecent
changesincreasedfundingfortheWMATA, theregionaltransportationbody,18 and
gaveD.C. residentstheabilitytoattendanystateuniversityatthein-staterate19an
13 See, e.g., WiliamRaspberry, Why SeekStatehood for D.C.?, WASH.POST, Sept. 26, 1988,
atA15.
14 EdLazere& DavidGarrison,A NewFederal Contribution to the District of Columbia,
Need, Likely Impact, and Some Options, BROOKINGS INST. 3 (2005), available at http://
www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2005/11/cities%20lazere/20051116
_dcinfrastructure.pdf.
15 Id.
16 NationalCapitalRevitalizationandSelf-GovernmentImprovementActof1997, Pub.
L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251;ALICE RIVLIN ET AL., BUILDING THE BEST CAPITAL CITY IN THE
WORLD 81,100 (2008) [hereinafterRIVLIN 2008].
17 Lazere& Garrison, supra note14, at3.
18 See CleanRailroadsActof2008, H.R. 2095, 110thCong. §601 (authorizingsome
$1.5 billion in additional federal funding for WMATAs infrastructure).
19 See DistrictofColumbiaColegeAccessActof1999, Pub. L. No. 106-98, §3, 113 Stat.
1323 (1999).
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acknowledgmentthatstatesandnotcitiesareusuallyresponsibleforhighereducation.
Nevertheless, manysuchspecialspendingobligationsstilremaininplace.20
Atthesametime, D.C. facesseverallimitsinitsabilitytoraiserevenue. Thecentral
limit on the D.C. governments ability to raise revenue is that, as part of the Home Rule
Act, Congressexplicitlybarredthecityfrom taxingtheincomeofnon-residentswho
workintheDistrict.21 Everystatethattaxesincomesincludesataxonnon-residents
whoworkinthestate,22 butVirginiaandMarylandsuccessfulyfoughttoincludethis
limitintheHomeRuleAct.23 In1997, economistsestimatedthatthislimitcoststhe
Districtgovernment$1.4 bilionannually.24 In2005, thecityestimatedthatthecostwas
$2.2 billion,25 andthenumberissurelyhighernow, asincomesintheregionhavebeen
risingsubstantialy(forpurposesofcomparison, the2015 overalbudgetestimateis
$6.5 billion26). TheDistrictistreatedlikeacityfortaxingpurposes, notastate.
Nevertheless, statehoodwouldnotbeashort-termbudgetarypanacea.Inparticular,
NewColumbiawouldbeinafarworsetaxingpositionthanotherstatesbecauseofthe
hugeamountofnontaxablepropertyintheDistrict. Forexample, federallandtakesup
28% of the Districts land acreage.27 IftheDistrictcouldtaxthisproperty, itwould
increaseitsrevenueby$550 milion.28 TheDistrictstil, however, hasresponsibilityto
providepolice, fire, andotherservicesfortheseareas.29 Further, another3.9% ofthe
Districts taxable wealth is owned by non-profits.30 When combinedwith other
propertytaxexemptproperties, 42% ofthetotalpropertywealthofthecitycannotbe
taxed.31 Moreover, astateofNew Columbiawouldlargelylackwealthysuburbsthat
couldengageintransferpaymentswiththecentralcity.32
20 See Lazere& Garrison, supra note14, at4.
21 D.C. CODE §1-206.02(a)(5) (2013).
22 CAROL OCLEIREACAIN, THE ORPHANED CAPITAL: ADOPTING THE RIGHT REVENUES
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 10305 (1997).
23 Formoreonthesenegotiations, seeid. at105.
24 CAROL OCLEIREACAIN & ALICE M. RIVLIN, A SOUND FISCAL FOOTING FOR THE
NATIONS CAPITAL: A FEDERAL RESPONSIBILITY 4 (2012).
25 See RIVLIN 2008, supra note16, at21 n.13 (citingYESIM YILMAZ, D.C. OFFICE OF
REVENUEANALYSIS,CALCULATING THE IMPACT OFFEDERALPREEMPTIONS ON THE DISTRICTS
TAX REVENUE 4 (DRAFT Mar. 5, 2008)).
26 Letterfrom NatwarM. GandhitoMayorVincentGrayandChairmanPhilMendelson
(Nov. 3, 2013), available at http://cfo.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ocfo/publication
/attachments/FINAL_FY_2015_Current_Services_Funding_Level_Budget%5B1%5D.pdf.
27 OCLEIREACAIN & RIVLIN, supra note24, at4.
28 Id.
29 Id. at3.
30 JosephCordes, The Nonprofit Property TaxExemption:Who Benefits, Who Pays, and
by How Much, URBAN BROOKINGS TAX POLY CENTER (May. 2, 2012), http://urban.org
/taxandcharities/upload/panel-1-cordes.pdf.
31 OCLEIREACAIN & RIVLIN, supra note24, at4.
32 See RIVLIN 2008, supra note16, at25 (describinghow thecityofBaltimore, unlike
D.C., isabletoreceiveassistancefrom otherpartsofitsstate).
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Recognizingthesecounterveilingforces, AliceRivlin, aformerDirectorofthe
federalOfficeofManagementandBudgetandleadingexpertonthebudgetaryeffects
ofstatehood,33 concludedthatitisunclearifstatehoodwouldimproveorharm the
fiscalpositionoftheDistrict:
Theneteffectofalthesefiscalpositivesandnegativesassociated
withstatehoodisextremelyuncertain. Myguessisthatstatehood
wouldbringpositivenetfiscalbenefitstotheDistrict, providedit
includedthepowertotaxnon-residentincome(exceptforafed-
eralenclave), althoughlosingthesavingsfrom theRevitalization
Actof1997 wouldoffsetalargefractionofthegain.34
Up to this point, however, the traditional debate has focused on statehoods
immediateimpactonthecitybudget. Whatisnotacknowledged, though, isthevast
impactthatdynamiceconomicchangewouldhaveonthefinancesofNew Columbia.
AsI outlinebelow, theseeffectswouldbesubstantial. Inbrief, statehoodwouldhave
adramaticprocyclicaleffectonthelocalbudget, permitingtheDistricttotakebeter
advantageofgoodtimes, butleavingitatgreaterriskindownturns.
BeginwiththeadvantagethatNew Columbiawouldenjoyduringboom times.
Perhapsthestrictestandleastrationalrestraintthefederalgovernmentputsonthe
districtistheHeightofBuildingsAct,35 restrictingtheheightofbuildingsinD.C. based
onthewidthofnearbystreets.36 D.C.s economy is currently doing extremely well,37
but the restrictions of the Height Act (combined with D.C.s restrictive zoning re-
gime, whichwillaterbediscussed), havemeantthatthecityfacesanenormouscrisis
in providing housing and office space. D.C. currently has the nations lowest office
vacancyrate,38 andthecentralbusinessdistricthasthethirdhighestrentpersquare
foot.39 Housingissimilarlyexpensive.40
33 See id. at9.
34 If the District of Columbia Becomes a State:Fiscal Consequences:HearingBefore the
Spec. Comm. On Statehood and Self Determination (D.C. 2009) (statementofAliceM. Rivlin).
35 BuildingHeightActof1910, Pub. L. No. 61-196, 36 Stat. 452 (1910).
36 D.C. CODE §6-601.05 (2014).
37 JoelKotkin, The ExpandingWealth of Washington, FORBES (Mar. 19, 2012, 9:32 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/joelkotkin/2012/03/19/the-expanding-wealth-of-washington.
38 JeffClabaugh, D.C. Has Nations Lowest Office Vacancy Rate, WASH. BUS.J. (Aug. 26,
2013),htp:/www.bizjournals.com/washington/breaking_ground/2013/08/dc-has-nations-lowest
-office-vacancy.html.
39 KenMcCarthy, Some Needed Perspective on Sluggish Leasing, COM. OBSERVER
(Sept. 26, 2013), htp:/commercialobserver.com/2013/09/some-needed-perspective-on-sluggish
-leasing/.
40 JustinKarp, Washington, D.C. RentingCosts AmongHighest in Nation, Report Says,
WJLA (Apr. 2, 2012), http://www.wjla.com/articles/2012/04/washington-d-c-renting-costs
-among-highest-in-nation-report-says-74458.html.
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IfD.C. becameastate(orjoinedMarylandthroughretrocession), theHeightof
BuildingsActwouldlikelybeheldunconstitutional.41 Freedfrom suchrestrictions,
D.C. wouldbeabletoaccommodategrowthfarmoreeffectivelyduringboom times.
Such growth could take many forms. For example, Vince Gray, the citys current
mayor, hascalledformodificationsintheHeightActtoallowtallerbuildingsdown-
town (a 25% increase above the height limit in the LEnfant City) and greater density
alongMetrolines.42 Inanycase, removingbuildingheightrestrictionswouldmake
D.C. anevenmoreeconomicallyvibrantplaceinprosperoustimes.
Thisnewfoundabilitytoharnessgrowth, however, comesatacost: whenlean
timeshitNew Columbia, theywillhitwithavengeance.
Nocityboomsforever. Downturnsinevitablyoccurforanynumberofreasons:
changesintransportationcosts, tastes, politics, orthedemandsofthebroadermacro-
economy.43 Moreover, theseshiftsareoftencausedbyforcesbeyondthecontrolof
local, city, orstatedecision-makers.
41 ThepowerCongressisinvokinginpassingdistrict-widerestrictionsonheightissurely
itspowerovertheDistrictunderArticleI, Section17 oftheConstitution. Whilethefederal
governmentcouldsurelystilllimitheightsofbuildingsinsomepartsofthecityunderits
otherpowers, itwouldneedtojustifywhypartsofNew Columbiathatarefurtherfrom the
WhiteHousethanunrestrictedRosslyn, Virginia, needheightrestrictions. Acknowledgingthis
aspartofapushforstatehood, proponentssuggestedthat, priortostatehood, theDistrictcould
give the Department of Interior a scenic easement that prevents anyone from building
abovethelimitssetbytheHeightAct. See The Economic and Financial Impacts of District of
Columbia Statehood:HearingBeforeSpec. Comm. on Statehood and Self Determination (D.C.
2009) (statementofWalterSmith), available at http://www.web.archive.org/web/201308
14103015/http://www.dcvote.org/trellis/struggle/statehood_testimony_smith.pdf;thenclick
Browse History; then select August 14, 2013). However, such a proposal is probably not
constitutionalfortworeasons. First, undertheequalfootingdoctrine, statesmustbeadmitted
asequalsovereigns, andastatewithoutthepowertoregulateheightswouldnotbeequalto
othersovereigns. See generally ValerieJ. M. Brader, Congress Pet: Why the Clean Air Acts
Favoritism of California Is Unconstitutional Under the Equal FootingDoctrine, 13HASTINGS
W.NW.J.ENVTL. L.&POLY 119, 151 (2007). Further, zoning is part of a states police power
anditcannotbeheldtoacontractdelegatingthatmuchofitspolicepower. Euclidv. Ambler
RealtyCo., 272 U.S. 365, 373 (1926);see also UnitedStatesTrustCo. v. NewJersey, 431 U.S.
1, 2123 (1977) (holding essential parts of a states police power cannot be contracted away).
42 See Changes to the Heights Act:ShapingWashington, D.C., for the Future, Part II:
HearingBefore H. Comm. On Oversight and Reform, 113thCong. (2013) (statementof
HarrietTregoning, DirectoroftheOfficeofPlanning), available at http://oversight.house
.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Tregoning.pdf;RichardSimon, Washington, D.C., Might
Finally Get Tall Buildings, GOVERNING (Dec. 3, 2013) available at http://www.governing
.com/news/headlines/Washington-Might-Finally-Get-Tall-Buildings-.html;AaronWiener,
Issa Offers Hope for D.C. Autonomy on BuildingHeights, WASH.CITYPAPER (Dec. 2, 2013),
available at http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com /blogs/housingcomplex/2013/12/02/issa
-offers-hope-for-d-c-autonomy-on-building-heights/.
43 See Schleicher2013, supra note 2, at 169293 (notingthatcitieswhichdonotsubstan-
tiallyhindernew developmentseelargerpopulationgrowths).
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Whatform mighttheseshockstakeinD.C.? Onepossibilitywouldbethatthe
recenttrendtowardtheurbanizationofwealthyprofessionals,44 atrendthathasgreatly
bolstered D.C.s finances, slows or reverses. Other areas in the D.C. Metro-Region, like
Rosslyn or Tysons Corner, could develop into true downtowns, chalenging D.C. for
dominance in the region. Moreover, D.C.s economy is substantialy concentrated in
alimitednumberofsectors, suchaslaw (evenmorethanthoseotherpartsofthe
nation that are highly dependent on federal money, like Northern Virginias govern-
mentandconsultantheavyeconomy).45 Shocks specific to these industriesincreased
regulation of lobbying, for instance, or deregulation of the legal marketmight be
feltparticularlyhardinD.C. Or, perhaps, aterroristatackinD.C. couldharm thecity
withoutharmingthegeneralregion.
Whateverthecause, overtime, atleastsomeregionaldownturnislikelytoim-
pactD.C. atsomepoint. Ifandwhenitdoes, thestateofNew Columbiawouldbe
particularlyhard-pressedtocopewithdownturn.
Firstandforemost, asastateexistingwhollywithinonemetropolitanarea, New
Columbiawouldbeunabletocalonresourcesfrom regionsthatdidnotfaceasimilar
shock. Thisisasharpcontrasttootherstategovernments, whichcommonlymake
suchtransfersintimesofregionaldecline. NewYorkState, forexample, transferred
substantialresourcesfrom upstateareastoNew YorkCityduringtheurbandown-
turnofthe1970s,46 buttodayshiftsresourcesfrom downstatetoupstatetomitigate
that regions relative decline.47 Marylands overall economy was once powered by
44 See ALAN EHRENHALT, THE GREAT INVERSION AND THE FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN
CITY 35 (2012); David Schleicher, The City as a Lawand Economic Subject, 2010 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1507, 151112 (2010); Schleicher 2013, supra note 2, at 168990.
45 Asof2010, NorthernVirginiaregionhad12,565 legaljobsoutofatotalregional
populationofroughly2.8 million, aratioofonelawyerper223 citizens. See StephenS.
Fuler& ElenHarpel, Workforce Trends and Occupational Forecasts for Northern Virginia
20102020, GMU REGIONAL STUDIES (June2011), available at http://cra.gmu.edu/pdfs
/studies_reports_presentations/Workforce_Trends_and_Occupational_Forecasts_in_Northern
_Virginia.pdf. Bycontrast, D.C. has51,928 lawyersforapopulationofroughly610,000, an
incredibleratioofonelegaljobpertwelvecitizens. See American Bar Association National
Lawyer Population, AM. BAR ASSN (2013), available at http://www.americanbar.org
/content/dam/aba/administrative/market_research/2013natl_lawyer10_year_trends
.authcheckdam.pdf.
46 For a view of New York States support of New York City during the bankruptcy crisis
ofthe1970s, seeFlushingNat. Bank v. Mun. Assistance Corp. for City of New York, 358
N.E.2d848, 855 (N.Y. 1976).
47 Cf. Jaison R. Abel& Richard Deitz, New Measures of Economic Growth and
Productivity in Upstate NewYork, 14 CURRENT ISSUES IN ECON. & FIN. 9 (2008), available
at htp:/www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues/ci14-9.html(showinghowupstateNew
Yorkhaspoorereconomicgrowththandownstateandtheresttocountry);Givingand
Getting:Regional Distribution of Revenue and Spendingin the NewYork State Budget, Fiscal
Year 200910, NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER INST. OF GOVT (Dec. 2011), available at http:
/www.rockinst.org/pdf/nys_government/2011-12-Giving_and_Geting.pdf. Fordataonupstate
New Yorks decline in manufacturing, see Jason Bram & Michael Anderson, Declining
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Baltimores economic dynamism,48 butnowittransfersmoneyfrom therichsuburbs
of D.C. to prop up Baltimores challenged economy.49 A stateofNew Columbia,
however, wouldbeunabletomakesuchtransfers.
Toseetheimpactofthislimit, considerRhodeIsland. Today, RhodeIslandis
almostentirelypartoftheProvidence-FallRiver-Warwick, RI-MA Metropolitan
StatisticalArea.50 Duringtherecenteconomicdownturn, alargenumberofRhode
Islandmunicipalitiesfacedfiscalcrises, includingonebankruptcyinCentralFalls.51
Butthestate, facedwithsimultaneouslocalcrisesandfiscalproblemsofitsown,
wasinnopositiontohelp.52 Asaresult, RhodeIslandwasparticularlyvulnerable
toeconomicharm.
Moreover, shouldfiscalcatastrophecometopass, thestateofNew Columbia
wouldbefarlessequippedtorequestnationalassistance. Thenationalgovernment
has thus far maintained a strict no bailout rule for state governments, seeking to
avoidmoralhazard.53 Moreover, citieshaveaccesstoChapter9 bankruptcy, butas
astategovernment, NewColumbiawouldnot.54 Asaresult, shouldaD.C. economic
downturnbecomeabudgetcrisis, thestateofNew Columbiawouldlackaccessto
severalcrucialmeansofrecovery.
Manufacturing Employment in the New York-New Jersey Region: 19691999, 7 CURRENT
ISSUES IN ECON. & FIN. 1 (2001).
48 See generally EleanorS. Bruchey, The Development of Baltimore Business: 18801914,
MD. HIST. MAG., Spring 1969, at 1842 (describing the industrialdevelopmentofBaltimore
between 18801914).
49 OCLEIREACAIN&RIVLIN, supra note 24, at 910 (discussing present-day wealth transfers
toBaltimore). Otherexamplesofsuchcity-to-non-cityregionaltransfersarequitecommonin
either direction. In Washington State, Seattles economy is a substantial net contributor to
ruralcoffers, whileinMinnesota, redistributionfrom ruralareassubsidizescityservices. See
LinkingState Spendingto Where Taxes are Generated is a Bad Idea, SEATTLE T. ONLINE
(Jan. 23, 2011, 4:15 PM), htp:/seatletimes.com/html/editorials/2014001088_edit24onestate
.html;BenOleson, A Brief History of Minnesotas System of Government Finance, STRONG
TOWNS (2011), http://www.webarchive.org/web/20111114030027/http://www.strongtowns
.org/storage/reports/A%20Brief%20History%20of%20Minnesotas%20System%20of
%20Local%20Government%20Finance%201960-2010.pdf.
50 See MAY 2013 METROPOLITAN, supra note7.
51 See JessBidgood, Plan to End Bankruptcy in Rhode Island City Gains Approval, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 7, 2012, atA21.
52 MaryWilliamsWalsh& AbbyGoodnough, A Small Citys Depleted Pension Fund
Rattles Rhode Island, N.Y. TIMES, July12, 2011, atB1, available at http://www.nytimes
.com/2011/07/12/business/central-falls-ri-faces-bankruptcy-over-pension-promises.html
?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
53 See DavidA. Skeel, Jr., States of Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 677, 70406 (2012)
(describing how federal bailouts for states is not feasible). The federal governments reluctance
tobailoutthestatesislongstanding, beginninginthe1840s. See ThomasSargent, An American
History Lesson For Europe, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 2012, atA17, available at http://online
.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970204740904577193032770537826.
54 Skeel, supra note 53, at 67980 (noting that municipalities may file for bankruptcy
whilestategovernmentslackthatoption).
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Bycontrast, inthestatusquo, D.C. cancallonthefederalgovernmentfor
assistance. Indeed, asacreatureofthefederalgovernment, D.C. cancountercyclicaly
benefitfrom boom timesanywhereelseinthecountrywhencompensatingforlocal
chalenges.55 Moreover, whentheDistrictfacesfiscalcrisis, asitdidin1997, itisable
toturntothefederalgovernmentforhelp(asdiscussedabove).56
Takentogether, whatdotheseprocyclicalchangesmeanforthecaseforD.C.
statehood? Theycertainlystrengthenthecaseforretrocession(joiningwithMaryland)
insteadofstatehood. Retrocessionwouldalow theDistricttoharnessthebenefitsof
boom timessuch as by changing building regulationswhile allowing for transfers
intimesoftrouble.
However, ifstatehoodwerepursued, thereareanumberofspecificprotections
New Columbiacoulddesigntomitigateaboom-bustcycle. First, thefactthatNew
Columbiawouldbebeterabletotakeadvantageofgoodtimes, butwouldbeexposed
tomoreriskinbadtimes, counselsinfavorofaconstitutionallyprotectedrainyday
fund. Sucharulemighttaketheform ofthebudgetruleusedinSweden, whichrequires
a1% budgetsurplusoverabusinesscycle.57 In any case, given states traditional ten-
dencytounderfundorraidtheirrainydayfunds, suchstrongprovisionswouldbe
necessarytoensurethatNew Columbiacouldeffectivelyweatherdownturns.58
At the same time, the imposition of a state balanced budget requirement that
barsNew Columbiafrom runningyear-to-yeardeficitswouldbeadestructivemis-
step. Forthereasonsoutlinedabove, New Columbiawouldlikelyhavegreatereco-
nomicswingsthanotherstates.59 A balancedbudgetrulewouldonlyexacerbatethese
swings, preventingcountercyclicalspendinginbadtimesandrequiringincreasesin
goodtimes.60 Thus, thetraditionalbenefitsofbalancedbudgetruleswouldnotout-
weightheiruniquedisadvantagesintheNew Columbiancontext, andsotheyought
tobeavoided.
55 Indeed, the1997 financialchallengeoutlinedabovemaybeseenasthefederalgovern-
mentredistributingresourcesfrom thethengenerallyprosperousnationintothelocally
depressedDistrict. See supra notes 1620 and accompanying text.
56 See id.
57 See EdDolan, How Smart Fiscal Rules Keep Swedens Budget in Balance, BUS. INSIDER
(Aug. 1, 2011), http:/www.businessinsider.com/how-smart-fiscal-rules-keep-swedens-budget
-in-balance-2011-8.
58 See BrianGalle& KirkJ. Stark, Beyond Bailouts:Federal Tools for PreventingState
Budget Crises, 87 IND. L.J. 599, 601 (2012). Thatsaid, D.C. hasrecentlybeendoingagood
jobofprovidingmoneyforitsrainydayfund. BenjaminR. Freed, D.C. Announces $417
Million Surplus to Be Added to Rainy-Day Fund, DCIST (Jan. 29, 2013), http://dcist.com
/2013/01/dc_announces_417_million_surplus_to.php.
59 ThenewstatewouldhavetoendurelosingthegovernmentbenefitsCongressplanned
toawardit, butwouldgaintheabilitytotaxout-of-stateworkers. See supra notes 1626 and
accompanyingtext.
60 See Galle& Stark, supra note 58, at 60001 (describing how states are vulnerable to the
cycleofrecession-reinforcingbudgetcrises).
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II. NEW COLUMBIAN POLITICS
Beyonditseconomicidiosyncrasies, New Columbiawouldalsohaveaspecial
breedofstatepolitics. Inparticular, itwouldfaceboththeperilsoflimitedparty
competitionandthepromiseofnew formsofgovernmentinnovation.
First, onemustconsiderpoliticalcompetitioninNew Columbia. Traditionally,
bigcitypoliticsareverydifferentfrom nationalorstatepoliticsinanimportantway:
almost all non-mayoral races are what political scientists call second order, or
determined by voter preferences at other levels of governmentlocal city council
votingfollowsPresidentialvoting.61 InmostbigcitiesinAmerica, thismeansthere
isnopartisancompetition.62 Thisturnsouttohavedramaticeffectsontheoutputsof
theirlegislatures.63
Asacity-state, New Columbiawouldeffectivelybeastategovernmentwiththe
politicsofabigcity. Whatwouldthismean? Mostsignificantly, theabsenceofpar-
tisan competition would make New Columbias government less responsive to the
opinions of the general public. Statehood would take D.C.s existing pathologies
its reliance on aldermanic privilege, the economicaly destructive limits it places on
growth, and its regular corruptionand open them to more policy areas.64 However,
wereitspoliticsimproved, statehoodwouldalsoalowD.C. toserveasamodelfornew
combinationsofpoliciesthatothercities, duetoconflictwiththeirstatecapitals, have
notbeenabletoconsider.
OneneedonlyquicklyperuseelectionreturnstoseethatD.C. haslittlegeneral
electioncompetition.65 Democratswinwithpercentagesclosetothehugepercent-
agesthatthePresidentcarriedinD.C.66 Onemightthinkthat, inanoverwhelmingly
61 David Schleicher, Why Is There No More Partisan Competition in City Council
Elections?:The Role of Election Law, 23 J.L. & POL. 419, 41920, 457 (2007) [hereinafter
Schleicher 2007] ([T]he less prominent the race the more likely that party identification . . .will
predict a voters selection.).
62 See id. at 41920; Christopher S. Elmendorf & David N. Schleicher, Informing
Consent:Voter Ignorance, Political Parties and Election Law, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 363,
38890 (2013) (describing voter ignorance even in primary elections).
63 Statelegislativeelectionsarefrequentlysecond-order, too, buttoalesserdegreeand
withdifferentconsequencesinplaceswherethepartiesaremorecompetitive. See Elmendorf
& Schleicher, supra note 62, at 399400 (defining a second-order election as one in
whichvotersrespondtocandidatesandcandidatesappealforvotes, onthebasisofpolitical
developmentsin a different area.).
64 Foranexplanationofaldermanicprivilege, seeSchleicher2013, supra note2, at
17101711. For the pernicious impact of single-party rule, see id. at 16991708.
65 See Election Results, D.C. BOARD OF ELECTIONS (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.dcboee
.org/election_info/election_results/.
66 See id.,availableat htp:/www.dcboee.org/election_info/election_results/2012/November
-6-General-Election/.
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Democratictown, therealcompetitionisinprimaries. Butthismissesacentraldistinc-
tionbetweenprimariesandgeneralelections.67 Votersknow littleaboutindividual
candidatesinlegislativeraces, butthisisnotparticularlyimportantinthegeneralelec-
tions as voters canand douse the party membership of candidates as a heuristic
device.68 WhenvotingforCongress, bysimplyknowingthatacandidateisaDemocrat
orRepublican, voterscanlearnalmosteverythingrelevantaboutthem. Thisisnottrue
inprimariesatanylevel, whichhavenoon-ballotheuristicstodifferentiatebetween,
say, centristandliberalDemocrats, nevermindbetweencandidatesthatdifferonlocal
issues. Further, voterscannotuseanunderstandingofhow thingshavegoneinthe
pastwhat political scientists call retrospective voting69because it is difficult to
know whetheranyindividualcandidateisresponsibleforcurrentconditions, whereas
ingeneralelections, voterscanholdthepartyincontrolofthelegislatureresponsible
forgovernmentalsuccessesorfailures.
TheabsenceofpartycompetitionhasdramaticconsequenceinD.C. First, andmost
obvious, isthatD.C. hasasubstantialcultureofpoliticalcorruption. From theMarion
Barry imbroglio to investigations against Mayor Vincent Grays campaigns, the District
hasbeenrepeatedlydoggedbyscandal.70 Thissordidhistoryconfirmswhattheory
suggests: intheabsenceofcompetition, incumbentsarelessafraidoflosingandmore
willingtotakerisks, leadingtocorruption.71
Second, thelackofpoliticalcompetitionengendersirrationalandsuboptimal
neighborhoodparochialism. AsarguedbyBarryWeingastandJohnFerejohn, among
others, legislaturescangetintosuboptimalequilibriumsrelyingondistribution.72 The
mostwellknownoftheseisporkbarrelspending.73 A legislaturecansupportlower
taxesandlowerspendingoveral, butendupinahighspending, hightaxequilibrium
67 Elmendorf& Schleicher, supra note 62, at 367, 38889.
68 Id. at386, 404.
69 See JideO. Nzelibe& MatthewC. Stephenson, Complementary Constraints:Separation
of Powers, Rational Voting, and Constitutional Design, 123 HARV. L. REV. 617, 624 (2010).
70 See PaulSchwartzman& MikeDeBonis, D.C. Grapples with Culture of Corruption,
WASH. POST, June9, 2012, atA1, A18, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/local
/dcs-political-corruption-has-deep-roots/2012/06/09/gJQAqvL9QV_story.html (Politicians
will say theres a culture of corruption, and often people say its rhetoric, said Bryan Weaver,
a Democratic activist who has campaigned for the council. But when it comes to D.C., theres
acultureofcorruptionthatreallyexists. Whatgetspassedoffaspoliticsasusualarehuge
ethical lapses.).
71 DavidSchleicher, IWould,but I Need the Eggs:Why Neither Exit NorVoice Substantially
Limits BigCity Corruption, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 277, 288 (2011).
72 JOHN A FEREJOHN, PORK BARREL POLITICS: RIVERS AND HARBORS LEGISLATION,
19471968 23352 (1974); Barry Weingast, A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional
Norms, 23 AM. J. POL. SCI. 245, 249, 25253 (1979).
73 GeraldGamm&ThadKousser, Contingent Partisanship: When Party Labels Matterand
When They Dontin the Distribution of Pork in American State Legislatures,AM.POL.SCI.
ASSN 2013 ANNUAL MEETING 1 (2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2300304
(describingthelargebodyofresearchinthisarea).
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because members most prefer spending in their districts. This prisoners dilemma-
likesetofpreferencescanresultinastablenorm ofallmemberssupportingalother
members projects because they are worried that deviating from this norm wil result
inlosingtheirownporkproject.
Partycompetitionisakeyantidoteforthistypeofbadnorm development. As
Mathew McCubbinshasshown, partiesinlegislaturesexistinparttoconstraintheir
membersfrom offeringamendmentsthatmightpassbutwouldharm otherparty
members.74 Backbenchers give party leaders the power to do thisto set the voting
rules and orderbecause the leaders have incentives to strengthen the party brands
acrossallseats. Partyleaderscanhelptheircaucusoutoftheseprisonerdilemma-like
defect equilibriums and into agreements to work in their collective interest.75 Strong
partiesandstrongpartycompetitionleadstolessporkspending, somethingwecan
see in todays Congress.76
Yet, asGeraldGamm andThadKousserhaveshown, whensuchpartycompeti-
tionislacking, suboptimallog-rollingandprotectionism prevail. Inparticular, Gamm
and Kousser note that uncompetitive legislatures feature more district bills or
decisionsbyagenerallegislaturetopassbillsthatarespecifictoonearea, usually
indeferencetothememberfrom thatareaandwithlittleregardfortheiroverall
aggregateimpactonthepolity.77
In one-party D.C., this pork barrel equilibrium is precisely what has played out.
Nowhereisthepatternclearerthaninthefieldofhousingdevelopment. D.C., as
notedabove, facesamajorcrisisinaffordablehousingandofficespace.78 Yet, despite
thecrisis, thecitycouncilhasresistedpermittingnew construction.79 Aspreviously
noted, part of the reason for this is the Height Acts limit on building heights.80 Yetto
asubstantialdegree, constructionhasalsobeenlimitedbyordinarymunicipalzoning
restrictions. Why would the Citys leaders vote to zone out growth in a time of pros-
perity and opportunity? A key reason is the city councils tradition of aldermanic
74 See generally GARY W.COX&MATHEW MCCUBBINS,LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN:PARTY
GOVERNMENT IN THE HOUSE (2ded. 2007);GARY W. COX & MATHEW MCCUBBINS, SETTING
THE AGENDA: RESPONSIBLE PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
46 (2005); D. RODERICK KIEWIET & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE LOGIC OF DELEGATION:
CONGRESSIONALPARTIES AND THEAPPROPRIATIONSPROCESS 12 (Benjamin I. Page ed. 1991).
75 Andofcoursetoscrewtheotherparty!See generally Gamm & Kousser, supra note73.
76 DavidSchleicher, How Polarization Cooked Congresss Pork, PRAWFSBLAWG (May8,
2012,9:17AM),htp:/prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2012/05/-how-polarization-cooked
-congresss-pork-.html.
77 See GeraldGamm & ThadKousser, Broad Bills or Particularistic Policy?:Historical
Patterns in American State Legislatures, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 151, 151, 165 (2010).
78 See supra notes 3740 and accompanying text.
79 See AaronWeiner, Cheh Considers Bill That Would Give ANCs More Input on
Residential Buildings, WASH.CITYPAPER (Mar. 29, 2013), htp://www.washingtoncitypaper
.com/blogs/housingcomplex/2013/03/29/cheh-considers-bill-that-would-give-more-input-on
-residential-buildings/[hereinafterWeiner1].
80 D.C. CODE §6-601.05 (2012).
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privilege, a convention by which leaders defer to local advisory neighborhood com-
missionsandthecouncilmemberwhorepresentsthelocationofpotentialnew build-
ingprojects.81 This tradition directly parallels the sort of suboptimal go along to get
along equilibrium that characterizes one-party legislatures, and that would form the
coreofpoliticalcultureinNew Columbia.
D.C.s regular use of this aldermanic privilege, as abetted by a lack of party
competition, hasledtodeeplyilogicaloutcomes. Forinstance, outsideofdowntown,
themostlogicalplaceinthecitytobuildnew housingisneighborhoodsinupper
Northwest, wherepropertyvaluesarehigh(evidenceofdemand) anddensityislow.82
However, homevoters in those neighborhoods do not like new construction, as it
wouldreducethemonopolyrentstheygetfrom owningintheseritzyareas.83 Why
doesnt the rest of the city council simply overrule them for the benefit of all? Why
does it sanction this type of protectionism by the citys richest residents? The answer
isaldermanicprivilege. Zoningamendments, forallintentsandpurposes, mustbe
approvedbythecouncilmemberfrom thearea.84 Therestofthecouncildefers, lest
projectsputtheirneighborhoodsagainstthewishesoftheirhomevoters. Theresult-
ingoutcomeisdeeplyunsatisfying.
LeavingdecisionsaboutthedevelopmentoftheupperNorthwestinthehandsof
itscouncilmemberisnomoreattractivethanleavinghedgefundregulationtothe
MemberofCongressfrom Greenwich, Connecticut, orgunsafetyregulationtothe
representativefrom Madison, NorthCarolina(whereRemingtonArmsisheadquar-
tered). Thistypeofnorm iswhatprevailsintheabsenceofpartisancompetition. If
D.C. were to gain statehood, then it would inherit the suboptimal go along to get
along equilibrium that all one-party polities tend to develop.
Can this fate be avoided? As a part of any move towards statehoodand even if
statehood does not occurD.C. should consider reforms that make political compe-
titionmorelikely. I haveproposedanumberoftheseovertheyears.85 Onethatwould
81 See DavidAlpert, Its One City, Not Eight Cities, GREATER GREATER WASHINGTON
(Mar. 26, 2012), htp://greatergreaterwashington.org/post/14213/its-one-city-not-eight-cities/.
Here, Im referring to areas in which developers would need a zoning amendment in order
tobuild. However, atleastonememberofthecouncil(whoisalsoonthispanel) hasasked
forcitycouncilapprovalevenwhenprojectsareentirelycompliantwithlocalzoningrules
(i.e., whenbuildingisas-of-right). See Weiner1, supra note79.
82 FedwardPotz, The Rent Is Too Damn High, WE LOVE DC (Feb. 7, 2013, 8:00 AM),
htp://www.welovedc.com/2013/02/07/the-rent-is-too-damn-high/;AaronWiener, Where the
Millennials Live (and Other Demographic Treasures), WASH. CITY PAPER (Dec. 11, 2013),
htp:/www.washingtoncitypaper.com/blogs/housingcomplex/2013/12/11/where-the-milennials
-live-and-other-demographic-treasures/.
83 See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLU-
ENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLITICS 5152
(2001);Schleicher2013, supra note2, at1732.
84 Schleicher2013, supra note 2, at 170607.
85 Elmendorf& Schleicher, supra note 62, at 40911; Schleicher 2007, supra note61,
at 46473.
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beparticularlyattractiveinthecontextofD.C. wouldbeallowinginterestgroups
thatareabletogatherenoughsignaturestheabilitytomakeon-ballotendorsements,
alowingvoterstotellthedifferencebetweenaChamberofCommerce-supported
candidate and one supported by the Sierra Clubor whomever else.86 Inanycase,
suchmeasuresshouldbetopprioritiesifthestateofNew Columbiaistoovercome
acultureofcorruptionandreachbetterpolicyoutcomes.
Fortunately, however, New Columbias political culture would also offer striking
opportunitiesforinnovation. Inparticular, thecombinationofacityandstategovern-
mentopensunchartedandintriguingpossibilitiesforpolicydevelopment.
Tothesortofinnovationthatstate-cityfusionmightbring, considerlanduse. Most
citieslackthepowertocreatedifferentnuisancelawsgoverningdifferentneighbor-
hoods(sincecommonlaw istheprovinceofthestates). Asaresult, citiesareleft
withtheblunderbusstoolofrestrictivelanduserules, whichoftenleadtoexcessive
separationofuses. Forexample, citiesfrequentlyandunnecessarilybarresidents
from manufacturingzonesbecauseoftheriskthatresidentswouldsuethemanufac-
turersundernuisancelaws.87 However, if the city could simply create a special
nuisance zone,88 itwouldallow forresidentswhowerewillingtoliveinmanufac-
turingzonestodoso, creatinganew spaceforhousingexpansions. Asthispossibility
demonstrates, the ability to mix state power with a citys preferences should open
upsubstantialpolicyareasforexploration.
Finally, thestateofNew Columbiamightgeneratemoreradicalinnovations
simply because D.C.s population is different from the populations of most states. For
instance, D.C. would be one of the nations only majority-minority state,89 oneofthe
youngeststates,90 andthestatewiththemostLGBT residentsbypercentage(despite
beingtheeighthmostLGBT city).91
ProvidingthispopulationwiththepowersofStatehoodmightalowfornewpolicy
innovationsandexperimentsuntriedinthestatusquothatcouldyieldsubstantial
benefits. Moreover, allowingpopulationsthatareminoritiesonthenationalstage
the full power of state government would allow for greater dissenting by deciding,
asHeatherGerkenwouldnote,92 makinganydissentsagainstnationalconsensus
86 Schleicher2007, supra note61, at425 (notingthat, withonlypartyaffiliationonthe
ballot, voters have little information regarding candidates stances on local issues).
87 See Schleicher2013, supra note2, at1681.
88 See generally id. at1672, 1681.
89 Median Age, by State, USA TODAY (June10, 2010), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com
/news/nation/census/median-age-by-state.htm.
90 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, RESIDENT POPULATION BY RACE AND STATE: 2010 TBL. 19,
available at https://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0019.pdf.
91 JeremyW. Peters, The Gayest Place in America?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2013, at11,
14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/17/fashion/Washington-DC-has-thriving
-gay-lesbian-and-transgender-population.html?_r=0&pagewanted=all.
92 See HeatherK. Gerken, Dissentingby Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1770 (2005).
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morepowerfulbyprovidinganexampleofthosedissentsinaction. Whoknowswhat
differenceswouldemerge, butitwouldcreateanincrediblyexcitingopportunity.
CONCLUSION
New ColumbianStatehoodwouldcarryprofoundlegal, politicalandeconomic
implicationsfortheregion. Whilewecannotanticipateeveryconsequencethischange
wouldbring, severalareclearenough;economicaly, New Columbiawouldbebeter
poisedtothriveinboom times, yetfacestarkerrisksindownturns, whilepolitically,
itwouldenjoyanew scopeforinnovation, butwouldsuffertheharmsofsingle-party
corruption. Thislistisfarfrom complete, butbyturningourfocustothesesortsof
impactsanddynamics, wecanbegintounderstandjustwhatstatehoodwouldoffer
tothepeopleofNew Columbia.
